(3) Stanley knows that Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at T-town.
Stanley further knows that
(Factivity) For all subjects S and all propositions p: If S knows that p, then p. 6 Hence it is also true that (given that Stanley can apply (Factivity) to cases) (4) Stanley knows that if Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at T-town, then it will stop at T-town.
Given closure (or a basic form thereof)-(Closure-Basic) For all subjects S and all propositions p and q: If S knows that p and also knows that (p → q), then S knows that q 7 -we can infer from (3) and (4) that 6 This holds with necessity. For the sake of simplicity, I will skip the necessity operator here and below in the case of this and other necessary principles.
7 This is a simplified version of an acceptable principle of closure. One would have to add further whistles and bells, like the condition that the person competently deduces q from p and p → q.
We can skip this and other such details here because they don't matter for the main point here.
(5) Stanley knows that the train will stop at T-town.
This, however, contradicts (2). Which assumption has to go? 8 In the following I will lay out several possible strategies for the adherent of SSI to solve this problem (section 2).
The following sections (3-5) argue against the one, initially promising strategy. I will also point out unwelcome implications of this defence of SSI (sections 6-7) and end by discussing a lost proposal to solve the problem for SSI (section 8).
Denying Knowledge of Knowledge
It seems very desperate to deny factivity. If anything does not satisfy the factivity condition, then it is not knowledge; factivity seems essential to and at least partly constitutive of knowledge. Apart from this, even if one were to give deniers of factivity some credibility, that denial wouldn't help the defender of SSI much at all: They need an independent motivation for it which goes beyond the ad hoc reason that the denial of factivity would solve a problem for the theory. Rescuing an interesting epistemological 8 All I am arguing for here is that SSI leads to contradictions not in all but only in some though important cases: when the stakes of the person who makes the relevant cross-context judgments are significantly higher than the stakes of the other subject. This is sufficient to get SSI into serious trouble. The problem presented here arises in a pure third-person form. There is no element of some irreducible first-person perspective that is doing any work in the exposition of the problem (no matter whether Stanley believes or knows that he is indeed Stanley) . There is thus also no shift (legitimate or illicit) between first-and third-person perspectives involved
here. Thanks to a referee for pressing me on this. Nozick also does not help us much in our search for independent non-ad-hoc reasons to give up the likes of (Closure-Basic). He states that such a principle is incompatible with his own account of knowledge 11 but also adds an (astonishingly rarely discussed) diagnosis of closure failure. According to him, closure fails in cases where if the conclusion ('q') were false, the subject would still believe the premise ('p') and 9 See Dretske 1970 and Nozick 1981, ch.3. 10 See Dretske 2005 , 16-17. 11 See Nozick 1981 deduce the conclusion from it. 12 If the train were not to stop at T-town (see (5)),
Stanley might still believe that Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at T-town (see (3)) and infer that the train will stop at T-town. However, even if our case can be diagnosed by Nozick, his diagnosis still doesn't offer us an independent reason (which would not be ad hoc) to deny (Closure-Basic) or anything like it. How could it?
Does closure perhaps fail in cases where there is some kind of "transmission failure"? 13 Here is what one could have in mind: Closure fails in cases where the conclusion ('q') is antecedently (to the inference) unknown by the subject but the subject's knowledge that p requires that she presupposes and takes for granted that q.
Whatever the details of such an idea, it is very hard to see in our case how Stanley's knowledge of the premise (that Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at T-town) requires the presupposition of the antecedently unknown conclusion (that the train will stop at T-town) (see also section 5 below). Finally, one might propose that closure fails in cases where the premises are of low stakes (e.g., that Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at T-town) but the conclusion is of high stakes (e.g., that the train will stop at T-town). Such a move also seems poorly motivated and ad hoc (see also section 4 below).
Let us then put both the denial of closure and the denial of factivity aside as potential strategies to solve our problem, without going further into these complex topics 
13
See for this idea Wright 1985, 432-438 , and Davies 1998, 351-355; however, both and discuss what are probably SSI's defenders' main arguments here. In sections 6 and 7 I will discuss bad implications of all these defences of SSI while I briefly discuss a last proposal of a way out of the problem for SSI in section 8.
First Failed Argument: P-Stakes and Kp-Stakes
Certainly, the stakes regarding a given proposition can be different from the stakes regarding somebody else's knowledge of that proposition. The following principle is false:
(Hand-in-Hand) For all subjects A and S and all propositions p: A's stakes regarding p are not significantly higher and not significantly lower than A's stakes regarding S knows that p.
A might not care at all whether Cairo is the capital of Egypt but care a lot whether S knows whether Cairo is the capital of Egypt, given that S is on a game show, would win a lot money with a correct answer to a question about Egypt's capital and has promised to split all gains with A. So, someone's stakes can be low regarding a given proposition but high when it comes to whether someone else knows that proposition.
One could object that in this case part of A's concern whether S knows that p is the concern whether p (at least sometimes a concern for X involves a concern for some necessary condition Y of X). However, the focus of A's concern in the case above is clearly on S's epistemic situation with respect to the relevant fact; there is thus much less of a focus on the fact itself. A's stakes are higher with respect to the former than with respect to the latter aspect of the situation (even if both are connected). Apart from that, it is not true for all necessary conditions Y of some given X that high stakes for X come with high stakes for Y: Even if Jack is coming to town is high stakes for Jill at t, it need not be high stakes at all for Jill whether someone is coming to town. 
Second Failed Argument: Transmission of Stakes
There is an argument against (3) (Stanley knows that Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at T-town) and the inconsistency claim which I have encountered quite often in discussion and which seems to capture the main point of resistance against the conclusion I am arguing for. Here it is, as applied to our original example. Stanley's stakes are high with respect to (1) (Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at T-town) because he can deduce from (1) together with some other premise (Factivity) a proposition which is high-stakes for him, namely that the train will stop at T-town. (Inferential Stakes) For all subjects S and all propositions p, q and r: If p is a highstakes proposition for S and if S can deduce p from q (together with some r), then q is itself a high-stakes proposition for S.
The defender of SSI will have to accept something along these lines. Just to mention another variation-a principle in terms of entailment rather than deducibility by S:
(Entailed Stakes) For all subjects S and all propositions p, q and r: If p is a high-stakes proposition for S and if q (together with some r) entails p, then q is itself a high-stakes proposition for S.
The problem is that such principles are incorrect. First of all -as already pointed out above-, stakes don't transfer to necessary conditions automatically or in every case: so, low stakes for Kp don't entail low stakes for p and not so low stakes for p don't entail not so low stakes for Kp. Let us look more closely at the following three problems.
Obviously (i), every proposition q entails some high-stakes proposition p if combined with certain other appropriate premises (whether of the form 'If q then p' or not). Hence, according to (Entailed Stakes) every proposition is a high-stakes proposition if some are. Since some are, every proposition is a high-stakes proposition. This, however, seems clearly false: Clearly, stakes differ from proposition to proposition (for a subject at a time). Defenders of SSI should try not to get into a situation where they have to deny this. A similar argument can (with slight modifications) be made against (Inferential Stakes)-but I won't go into this here to avoid repetitions.
Consider also (ii) an example involving a great number of premises from which a high-stakes conclusion can be inferred. Suppose a detective is working on some case.
There are 1000 different propositions describing different pieces of evidence. Only taken together they do imply a proposition which is of high stakes for the detective (namely that the chauffeur did it). It is very implausible that a particular single, isolated piece of evidence as such (e.g., that the profile of the tires of the chauffeur's private car is medium) should count as being of high stakes for the detective. Again, similar things hold (mutatis mutandis) for (Entailed Stakes).
Finally (iii), Stanley uses both (1) (Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at Ttown) and (Factivity) to infer the high-stakes (for him) proposition that the train will stop at T-town. If this makes (1) high-stakes, then presumably it also makes (Factivity)
high-stakes. The latter, however, is very implausible. But then it seems arbitrary to say that (1) is high-stakes for Stanley-given that (Factivity) is not. Why should one premise be high-stakes and the other not? Even if one were to restrict (Inferential Stakes) and (Entailed Stakes) to a small number of (types of) premises, one would still have to explain which propositions would be high-stakes given that they help infer or entail a high-stakes proposition and which propositions wouldn't be high-stakes for that reason. There are serious doubts that this can be done in any non-arbitrary way.
SSIists have, as far as I can see, not even begun to try to do this. As long as this is the case, we should reject the likes of (Inferential Stakes) and (Entailed Stakes) and not bet much on them. They don't give any plausible support to (6) and won't help against the inconsistency claim.
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Third Failed Argument: Independent and Prior Knowledge
There is another move the defender of SSI could make when arguing for (6) (Stanley
does not know that / whether Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at T-town):
adding further necessary conditions for knowing that someone else knows that p. What
Stanley apparently needs for knowledge that S knows that p is prior, independent knowledge that p, that is, knowledge that p which is not based on the knowledge that S knows that p; Stanley needs to base his knowledge of (1) 
20
Reductionists about testimony (see, amongst many, Fricker 1987 ) might protest here. According to them, one can only acquire knowledge of p through testimony if one has independent knowledge of the trustworthiness of the testifier or the reliability of the testimony (antireductionists about testimony deny all this). According to this idea, Stanley would need prior and independent knowledge of the trustworthiness of the testifier or the reliability of the testimony.
And this latter knowledge he might lack in his high-stakes situation. This counter-reply faces three problems. First, even if reductionism is true and the subject needs independent knowledge of the trustworthiness of the testifier or the reliability of the testimony, this still does not establish (Counter-KK) follows from and does not entail (Independent Knowledge) which is a special case of (Counter-KK).
If (Counter-KK) is true, then it seems that the defender of SSI can use it in order to reject (3) (Stanley knows that Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at T-town).
Using modus tollens, they can argue that since Stanley does not know that the train will stop at T-town, he also does not know that Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at T-town.
But is (Counter-KK) true? A's knowledge that p is either (i) prior to and independent from (not based on) the knowledge that B knows that p, or that the subject also needs independent knowledge of the testified content. Second and apart from that, this counter-reply would help to defend a general account of knowledge by using a very specific view about a particular source of knowledge; this, however, seems to get the cart before the horse. Third and related to the last point, anti-reductionism is a controversial view about testimony and it does not seem wise to add such burdens of proof to one's case for SSI.
(ii) not prior to or independent from (not based on) the knowledge that B knows that p.
Given the argument against (Independent Knowledge above), we can leave (i) aside
here. This leaves us with (ii). If the defender does not want to present the questionbegging argument discussed above (section 2), then they could only have in mind the case where A's knowledge that p is based (typically: inferentially) on A's knowledge that B knows that p. Section 8 below will reject this option, and I refer the reader to that later section. So, both (Independent Knowledge) and (Counter-KK) are false. Our problem for SSI remains on the table.
Troubling Implications: Blindspots
No matter whether one goes with the first, second or third strategy of defending SSI (sections 3-5), there are further problems with the idea that Stanley does not know (1)
(Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at T-town) because he lacks knowledge of
The train will stop at T-town. These problems have to do with the implications the acceptance of (6) (Stanley does not know that / whether Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at T-town) would have for SSI. Here is a first one:
(Blindspot) For all subjects A and B and all propositions p: If A is in a high-stakes situation such that A does not know that p, and B is in a low-stakes situation such that B knows that p, then A does not know that B knows that p.
We can assume that the antecedent of (Blindspot) is quite often true. According to SSI, there would then be lots of quite simple truths about the knowledge of other people of which we would quite often have no knowledge. This is a serious limitation.
Furthermore, people usually hold that they don't suffer from this kind of epistemic limits ("Perhaps the threat of a Cartesian demon is a problem but not this!"). If that is so, the adherent of SSI would also have to add some plausible error theory which explains why subjects can get things so wrong so often. This is not an attractive situation for theorists (like the typical SSIists) who like to avoid attributing systematic error to subjects.
One could object that the antecedent (Blindspot) is not that often true: only when A finds themselves in extraordinary situations of considerably high stakes. But this, the objection would continue, does not happen that often. In response one should stress that high-stakes situations do not have to be situations of extraordinarily high stakes.
All that is needed for (Blindspot) to be true is that A's stakes are higher than B's such that B knows that p whereas A does not know that p. Lacking an argument for the implausible assumption that rarely the stakes differ significantly for different subjects in a given situation, the remarks just made are support for the claim that (Blindspot) will be true quite often, given SSI.
Unsurprisingly, the situation is additionally embarrassing for the adherent of SSI.
Stanley can reflect on all the above. If he does, he will have to admit that (7) I don't know whether Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at T-town but if I simply switch to a low-stakes situation I might well know that.
perhaps even paradoxical. There is another worrisome implication of the above defences of (6) (9) The train will stop at T-town but I don't know that and I don't even believe that.
Should Stanley then rather believe that not (1)? Should he (falsely) believe that (10) Hawthorne does not know that the train will stop at T-town?
Well, if we also grant -which seems plausible, given our little scenario-that Stanley knows that (11) If the train will stop at T-town, then Hawthorne knows it, then Stanley could easily infer from (10) and (11) that (12) The train will not stop at T-town, which is false. But recommending to believe something which entails something false, is not good advice. So, SSI should rather not recommend that Stanley believe the negation of (1) 
(Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at T-town).
The final option is suspension of belief about whether Hawthorne knows that the train stops at T-town. At the same time, Stanley should, taking SSI to heart, deny that he himself knows that / whether the train stops at T-town. But why suspension of judgment in Hawthorne's case when there is denial of knowledge in his own case?
Stanley would be conceding the epistemic possibility that Hawthorne 'might' know that the train will stop at T-town. Stanley would then hold that the question whether the train will stop at T-town is not settled for himself but that it might be settled for T-town) and give a 'dynamic diagnosis' of the case. 24 According to this idea, the argument needs to be modified slightly by adding a time-index. Here is the modified version (with t-2 being later than t-1). We have:
(1-t) Hawthorne knows at t-1 (and later) that the train will stop at T-town, (2-t) Stanley doesn't know at t-1 that (whether) the train will stop at T-town, (3-t) Stanley knows at t-1 (and later) that Hawthorne knows at t-1 (and later) that the train will stop at T-town, and (4-t) Stanley knows at t-1 (and later) that if Hawthorne knows at t-1 (and later) that the train will stop at T-town, then it will stop at T-town.
24
See also Brueckner and Buford 2009. 
Conclusion
The prospects for successfully defending (6) (Stanley does not know that / whether
Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at T-town) seem very bleak. We should thus give up (6) and stick with (3): Stanley knows that Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at T-town. It appears to be an epistemological truism that barring very special circumstances a person can often know that another person knows a given proposition.
A theory which denies or severely restricts this plausible principle has the burden of proof on its side and needs to come up with strong arguments against it (here against (3)). I have, on behalf of SSI, tried all serious arguments against (3) I could think of but they all fail. It is not just that SSI has its own problems -which theory hasn't got problems? The problems rather seem so serious that we should look for alternatives.
However, if the SSIist does not give up (3) and continues to adhere to factivity and closure, then it is hard to see how they can avoid falling into the contradiction derived in section 1. Something has to go and it's SSI.
